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This paper reports the results of a  study of meat and  fruit (apple) import measures  in
Pacific Basin countries.  The analysis is based on the certification manuals issued by the New
Zealand  Ministry  of Agriculture  to  veterinarians  and  other  experts  involved  in  export
inspection  and  certification.  Each  country's  requirements  are  established  by  bilateral
negotiation and/or agreement.  Thus the analysis is essentially inward looking as it represents
only one country's view of another country's importing requirements,  but outward looking
as the manuals cover a wide range of country conditions and experiences.
For  many  years,  New  Zealand  [NZ]  meat  exporters  only  had  to  satisfy  the  United
Kingdom [UK] Imported Food Regulations and only a small staff of inspectors was required.
Changes took place in the immediate post-war period when the United  States [US] market
for beef was opened up.  In 1956 and 1957 the US Department of Agriculture  [USDA] found
hair contamination on boned-out beef imports from NZ.  Rejection of some shipments led to
an increased level of surveillance by NZ inspection services and a tightening of the standards
required.  Emphasis was placed on the cleanliness of the product according to existing USDA
import standards.  In  1980, the NZ program for the control of residues  was reviewed by a
three-man mission from the USDA. Visits were made to export slaughterhouses to review
procedures  for tracing  animals  back to their farm of origin  (Ministry of Agriculture  and
Fisheries 1981).  The required standards were met and the Ministry subsequently noted that
NZ meat imported into the US had the lowest rejection rate of all meat imported into the US
(Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries  1985).
The  accession of Britain to the European Economic  Community  [EEC]  in  1973  also
brought NZ meat  exports to Europe under  the hygiene standards  of a new  authority - the
EEC  Intra-Community  Veterinary  Directive  [ICVD].  The  European  Community  [EC]
Council Directive on health  and veterinary inspection upon importation  of bovine animals,
swine and fresh meat from third countries  [3CVD] was introduced in December  1972, and
laid down detailed veterinary requirements for all third countries exporting fresh, chilled  and
frozen  meat,  and  animals  for  slaughter  to  the  EEC  (Official Journal of the European
Communities 1972).  The requirements  for the Directive were based largely on the Federal
Republic  of Germany's  domestic  legislation  for the  slaughter,  hygiene  and  inspection  of
bovine animals.  As a result, the EC meat hygiene standards are more stringent than those
required  by any other meat importing  country  and are not necessarily  applicable to other
countries (Cottrell  1982).
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79In responding  to the Directive,  NZ  raised the  question  of equivalent  practices  which
would reach the same objectives.  The following requirements  in the Directive  could have
been met if the equivalence  principle had been accepted  by both parties  (Cottrell 1982):
* replacement of wooden structures in stock yards;
* a maximum deep bone temperature of 7 degrees in boning rooms;
* packing of cuts in separate rooms from cutting rooms;
* self-contained  slaughterhouses for sick or suspect animals;
* cutting and inspection of lymph nodes;  and
* constant supervision by qualified veterinarians.
The intention of the Directive was that conditions of entry should be no less stringent than
those  stipulated  in  the  intra-community  directive  for  trade  between  member  states.
Arrangements were made for EC  inspectors to visit NZ so that a list of establishments which
met the requirements could be prepared.  Negotiations completed arrangements for changes
in technology,  post-mortem  health inspection techniques  and  carcass  cutting temperatures
(Ministry of Agriculture  and  Fisheries  1985).  Considerable  investment  was  required  in
updated buildings, assembly yards and processing facilities.  Estimates are that the programme
cost producers  $NZ250m for investments over and above the standards  required by other
meat importing  countries (about $NZ5,000 per livestock farmer) (Cottrell  1982).  This was
due,  in part, to the fact that 3CVD  was wider in scope than the equivalent USDA standard
with  emphasis  on structures  and storage  as well as product  cleanliness.  Currently, NZ  is
negotiating with the European Union [EU] a bilateral veterinary agreement to standardize and
economize on requirements for inspection and certification (Appendix  1).  It is important to
establish equivalence  on production  systems which achieve the same  objectives and reduce
costs of meeting the required standards.
Within the US, Canada,  and the EU, there is now a move by governments to move the
primary responsibility for the safety of food to processors and to improve the performance
of programmes by mandating that all processors design food safety programmes and process
foodstuffs  in accordance with specified  principles.  There  is also  a corresponding trend to
move away from a prescriptive set of procedures designed to deliver safe food (command and
control procedures) towards performance based standards using pathogens  as the indicator
of  performance.  Discussions between the US and NZ, and Canada and NZ, have advanced
on the basis that exporters can demonstrate that new  systems can perform at least as well, if
not better, than traditional programmes.  With the EU, similar proposals are being negotiated
for equivalence  though not yet for processor  self-regulating  systems (NZ MAF  1995).
The US market has developed as the single most important market for NZ beef while the
EU remains the most important market for lamb meat.  Meat products as a whole formed  17.2
percent of total exports in 1993-94 with a value of $3.2b.  Some 57 percent of beef and 70
percent  of lamb produced was exported.  Principal markets for beef, beside the US, were
Canada, Japan,  and South Korea.  Principal markets for lamb, beside the UK and the EU,
were  Saudi  Arabia and the Pacific  area (Table  1).  While most beef was  sent to the US,
imports from NZ were only 1.5 percent of  total US production.  And in the case of lamb, NZ
imports to the whole of the EU represented only  15 percent of total consumption.
80Table 1.  Principal destinations for meat exports from New  Zealand, 1994
Destination  Beef and Veal  Lambmeat
tonnes  %  tonnes  %
United States  166,015  54.4  6,646  2.4
Canada  52,172  17.1  7,363  2.7
United Kingdom  360  0.1  69,233  25.3
Rest of EU  488  0.2  72,161  26.3
Japan  16,982  5.6  10,138  3.7
South Korea  23,071  7.6  1,877  0.7
Papua New Guinea  1,895  0.6  22,415  8.2
Saudi Arabia  8  0.0  23,602  8.6
Pacific  area  20,450  6.7  34,550  12.6
Other  23,854  7.8  26,185  9.5
Total  305,295  100.0  274,170  100.0
Source: New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards'  Economic  Service Review,  1995, p.2 9.
Apples provide another example  where importing countries  have  varying standards  of
import regulation and requirements.  The pests and diseases affecting  apples  are many and
various and each country seeks protocols which prevent the introduction of new organisms.
NZ lists 146 recorded organisms which may affect the mature fruit of apple (Malus  sylvestris
var. domestica)  and importing countries can make use of this list in setting up their protocols.
New Caledonia, Taiwan,  and the US have exchanged information on this basis (Table 2).  The
three-way  classification  shows  whether  the  organism  is  actionable  under  the  importing
countries'  protocols, whether it is non-actionable,  or whether the appropriate classification
is unknown.
Table 2 shows that there is a relatively  high proportion of actionable organisms for New
Caledonia and the US, where the presence of an organism domestically may be the reason for
the non-actionable categorization.  Imports into other countries are guided by a list of default
maximum pest limits [MPLs].  Finding one specimen  in 600 on inspection means that there
is 95 percent confidence that an MPL of 0.5 percent will not be exceeded.  For an MPL of
5 percent up to 22 findings of live pests in 600 would be permitted and for  10 percent,  47
findings  of live  pests  at  the  same  confidence  level.  Each  country  can  have  a different
requirement for each species; the reason largely being whether or not the particular species
is a threat to the domestic economy in some way.
81Table 2.  Categorization  of organisms  present  in New  Zealand  domestic  apples  by
foreign governments
Actionable  Non-Actionable  Categorization
Government  Organisms  Organisms  Unknown
New Caledonia  22.652.125.3
Taiwan  10.9  61.9  27.2
United States  30.8  58.9  10.3
Average  21.4  57.6  21.0
Source: NZ MAF Regulatory Authority,  Wellington, New Zealand.
A disease  of the  apple  tree  (though  not  present  in  the  fruit)  is  Fire  Blight  (Erwinia
amylovora) which is a bacterium found in the EU and NZ but not in Australia and Japan.  The
establishment  of protocols  for  these  countries  provides  further  case  material  on  the
introduction of more uniform standards under the World  Trade Organization  [WTO]  Sanitary
and Phytosanitary [SPS] Agreement.  Apples are exported to the EU (61  percent), the US (15
percent),  Asia  and Pacific  destinations  (16  percent),  and Russia and the  Central  and East
Europe [CEE] countries  (5 percent).
Analyzing  the Meat Protocols for Pacific Basin Countries
The purpose of  this analysis was to discover whether the technical  barriers to trade for
meat in Pacific Basin countries were consistent with the objectives  of the then GATT Article
XX and whether  some measures  could be implemented  in a trade discriminatory  way.  The
following countries'  import measures were examined (Petrey and Johnson  1992):  Australia,
Canada, Fiji, French Polynesia, Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Japan, Malaysia,  New Caledonia, New
Zealand, Papua New Guinea,  Philippines,  South Korea,  Taiwan,  Thailand,  US, and Western
Samoa.  Commonalities between countries were sought  as well as signs of excessive  zeal in
drawing up or implementing the measures.  The methodology  employed follows closely that
of Hillman (1978,  1991).
Article XX  set out those measures  and  reasons  which  may  be  regarded  as  general
exceptions to the Agreement (GATT  1986, pp.37-3 8):
Subject to the requirement  that  such  measures  are not  applied  in  a manner
which would  constitute  a  means  of arbitrary  or unjustifiable  discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail,  or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement  shall be construed to prevent
the  adoption  or  enforcement  by  any  contracting  party  of measures.. .(b)
82necessary to protect  human,  animal or plant life or health;...and (g) relating to
the conservation  of exhaustible natural resources  if such  measures  are made
effective  in  conjunction  with  restrictions  on  domestic  production  or
consumption;...
The  GATT  Articles,  intended  principally  to  free  international  trade,  recognized,  in
principle,  two important conditions:  first, the purpose of such measures  must be to contribute
to a  legitimate domestic  objective;  and, second,  equivalent  regulations  must be applied to
domestically  produced  products  and  imports  (the  principle  of national  treatment).  Any
restrictions imposed on foreign practices for environmental or health reasons must reflect such
a  domestic commitment,  so that the exceptions  cannot be misused  as  a disguised  form of
protection (Runge  1990).
An example of the sanitary and various technical requirements for meat and meat products
exported from NZ  and imported into the US is shown in Table 3.  The table identifies  the
policy or practice that actually has to be observed  by exporters and the reasons lying behind
the measures.  The schedule is divided into meat and meat products,  edible by-products,  and
inedible by-products.  Each is described with specific certification requirements, terms, and
import prohibitions noted.  There is a heavy emphasis on labeling procedures and approvals.
Finally  the  requirements  mention  no  less  than  four pieces  of relevant  US  legislation  or
agencies, viz. the US Meat Inspection Regulations, the US Wholesale Meat  Act 1967, the US
Food and Drug Administration [FDA],  and the USDA.
For other countries,  there is a range of additional requirements  to those contained in the
general NZ official health/veterinary  certificate that  also must be endorsed.  A summary of
these additional requirements  by country is shown in Table 4.  Table 4 shows that importing
countries  are  generally  sensitive to pigmeat  disease  status,  to  possible  contamination  of
product  in  trans-shipment,  to  possible  transmission  of disease  in  by-products,  and  to
inspection requirements such as labeling and being  able to identify the part against the whole
(in case diseased tissue has been removed before export).
The most important feature of Table 4 is the lack of uniformity  in the range of measures
for meat  in  the region.  Generally  speaking,  the measures  are  more  comprehensive  for
countries with well-developed  domestic food safety systems and the will to train and recruit
the  necessary  veterinary  and  inspection  services.  In  some  cases,  labeling  requirements
additional to truth-in-labeling  appear to be carried to extraordinary  lengths.  In some cases,
large quantities are involved,  and in others the trade is minuscule  or does not exist.
At the bilateral level, these measures  are fully transparent to the participating  parties.
However, there is the wider question of whether such measures  are transparent in relation to
the problem they  seek  to contain?  Is the  underlying  problem  a true  health for imported
products  are part  of the Uruguay  Round  [UR]  agreement.  Without  risk  or a  form  of
nontariff protection?  Suggested rules for the assessment  of health risk developments  in this
83Meat and meat
products
Import prohibitions: carcasses or parts of carcasses
from which naturally associated tissues  such as the
peritoneum, pleura, or carcass  lymph nodes have been
removed, or that have required major rectification to
bring them up to standard, e.g., carcasses  with deep-
seated wounds or bruises or heavily contaminated
carcasses;
meat derived from:
- bodies having tuberculosis in the carcass or viscera;
- animals which have reacted  to a tuberculosis test;
horsemeat;
bobby calf veal, except boneless  bobby calf veal and
bone-in legs;
livers with portal lymph nodes missing;
edible lungs and lactating udders;
pieces of fresh, frozen or cured meat smaller than
50mm cubes, except where  recognizable  as an
anatomical  entity;
inedible rendered  fat, not denatured;
any meat or meat product considered adulterated or
mis-branded in terms of the US Meat Inspection
Regulations.
Import restrictions: imports restricted to slaughter
and preparation of product from approved
establishments;  the establishment and its products are
to be "at least equal to" requirements of the USA
Wholesale Meat Act 1967; imports restricted to
product subject to an approved  residue testing
programme,  approved quality sampling programme,
and packing materials approved by US Food and Drug
Administration.
Labeling restrictions: product, packaging, product
containers, must meet label standards  ("definitions"),
mandatory information, requirements  for petfood  and
other inedible byproducts,  label approval procedures,
all as specified,  e.g., "Labels must be first submitted  in
the form of a sketch ... labels should be submitted  in
triplicate ... and approved prior to submission of 4
sample printed labels or 4 colour photos..."
Other specific product requirements: restrictions on
salt-added boneless beef, use of proteolytic  enzymes,
mechanically recovered meat, cured meat products,
canned meat products, cooked beef, roast beef and
cooked  corn beef, ground or comminuted meat,
chopped  steaks, meat patties, meat loaves, pork and
smallgoods,  all as specified.
Certification requirements:
- imported product must meet completion
requirements, transit requirements, label approval and
re.idue nre-testino endorsement reouirements.
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Public Health/Truth in Labeling
Truth in Labeling
Table 3.  Nontariff trade measures for meat imported into the US*  from NZ
Commodity  Policy or Practice  Reason for Trade Measure
1  It  .V  .1V  L  llr  1K  V  laIiav  +  aaa ITable 3  continued
Fresh meat:
- derived  from livestock which have received ante and
post mortem veterinary inspection in establishments
approved for export into the USA
- not adulterated or mis-branded  as defined by the
regulations governing meat inspection of the US
Department of Agriculture
- products have been handled in a sanitary manner and
otherwise in compliance  with requirements at least
equal to those of the Wholesale Meat Act 1967 and
regulations.
- Certificates must be  endorsed for "spring lamb"  and
"yearling mutton" as specified.





Byproducts  - Other specific  product requirements: restrictions  on  Public Health/Truth in Labeling
edible  bobby calf veils as specified.
Certification: as for fresh meat  Public Health/Truth in Labeling
Byproducts - Other specific  product requirements: restrictions on  Prevent Entry into Edible Food
inedible  bobby calf vells inedible  bovine, ovine and caprine  Chain
glands, blood products,  factal calf serum, lungs, pig
hearts, valves for human transplant surgery and
inedible tallow, as specified.
Certification:  imported products should be certified:  Animal Health
- free from foot and mouth disease, rinderpest,
vesicular stomatitis,  anthrax, swine fever,  swine
vesicular  disease,  lumpy skin disease and contagious
bovine pleuropneumonia;
- after treatment, every precaution has been taken to
prevent contamination,  prior to dispatch from
processing premises;
- for lamb caps an Animal Health "Inedible"  health
certificate  is required as above;
- various byproducts require specific  certificate
endorsements.  Animal Health/Restrictions on Use
*(incl.  US mainland, States  of Alaska and Hawaii, Commonwealth  of the N Marianas, including Guan and Saipan,  American Samoa,  Midway and
Wake Islands, but excluding the  US Trust Territory  of the Pacific Islands (Palaus, Oonape,  Yap, Truck, and the Marshalls.)
85Table 4. Summary of country-specific  technical  and certification  requirements for
meat  imnorted into Pacific Rim  countries
Country  Certification  Trans-  Pigmeat  Byproduct  Whole  Labeling
Accepted  from  shipment  Status  Sterilization  or  Specified
New  Zealand  Restriction  Part
Edible  Inedible
Australia  NZ  Y  A  Y  Y
Canada  S  Y  N  Y  Y
Fiji  NZ  N
Fr Polynesia  S  Trich
Hong Kong  NZ  St  _Y
Indonesia  S
Japan  NZ  Trich  _YY
Malaysia  NZ  St  Y  YY
New  S  St  Y  Y
Caledonia
New  - Y  Y  Y
Zealand
Papua New  NZ  St  Y
Guinea
Philippines  NZ  St
South Korea  NZ__  ______  Y  Y  Y___
Taiwan  NZ__  _  _  _  _  _  Y  Y_  _
Thailand  NZ__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  __  _  _  _
Tonga  - ______  A________
United  S  Y  Y'  Y
States
W Samoa  NZ  _____A___  ____  ______
Certification  Pigmeat (Restrictions)  No Requirement  Specified:
NZ The New Zealand Official Meat Inspection  A  Aujesky's disease  No entry shown in table
Certificate,  AgMi 11  is accepted.  N  Imports refused  Y = Yes
S  Country specific Official Veterinary  and  Trich  Trichinosis tested
Public Health Certificates  are required.  St  Sterilized product
Source:  Petrey and Johnson (1992).
86area,  Article  XX hitherto has provided blanket powers for countries to take such measures
as they consider necessary to protect plant, animal  and human life and health.  It has been
virtually impossible to challenge a  country's measures  as unnecessary  as it  would be very
difficult to argue  such a case in terms of this Article.
From the data in Tables 3 and 4 and the data from other countries studied, the following
national reasons for sanitary and other technical  regulations  in the meat trade  area can be
identified: threats to animal health, threats to public health, need for truth-in-labeling,  meeting
consumer aesthetics,  maintaining  of product quality,  maintaining  security from tampering,
meeting customary practice (religious requirements), protection  of domestic  production, need
for market discipline, and prevention of entry into the edible food chain.  Within such a broad
framework,  case-by-case  studies  are  required  to  identify  the  original  motives  for  each
domestic policy measure  and whether it was "justified"  in GATT terms.
The Uruguay Round SPS Agreement
The objectives of the SPS Agreement  [the Agreement]  are to establish internationally  a
common set of rules and disciplines to guide the adoption, development  and  enforcement of
SPS measures in world trade which minimize their negative effect on trade (GATT  1992).
The Agreement encourages  the development and adoption of uniform international  standards
that protect human,  animal and plant health on as wide a basis as possible to reduce barriers
to international  trade.  Harmonization of SPS measures will encourage  countries to adopt
wherever  possible  standards  and  guidelines  set  by  international  scientific  standardizing
organizations  such as Codex Alimentarius,  the Organization  International Epizootics,  and the
International  Plant Protection  Convention.  The goals of the Agreement are to be achieved
by  greater  transparency,  openness  and  clarity,  by  promotion  of greater  international
harmonization  of standards,  rules  and  procedures,  and  by  promotion  of  an  improved
consultation and dispute settlement framework.
The  lack of uniformity between countries  appears  to have been the main driving force
behind  the  Agreement.  The  Cairns  Group  (a  mixture  of developed  and  developing
agricultural exporters including Australia  and NZ) made major submissions  along these lines.
"The  absence  of a  consistent  multilateral  framework  and  of transparency  in agreements
between  contracting  parties  has  resulted  in  much  of the  existing  contention  about  the
legitimacy  of SPS  measures"  (GATT  1990).  The  Agreement  sets  up such  a multilateral
framework.  The scientific  organizations  can provide  a set of independent benchmarks  and
still leave countries to adopt measures more stringent than those provided for by international
standards provided they can be established  with reasonable scientific justification.
A later proposal by the Cairns Group and others was to establish greater consistency  in
the  assessment  of risk linked  with importation of products.  The role  of the multilateral
framework  should  be  to  interpret, clarify  or reformulate Article  XX  and  other relevant
provisions......  "by recognition of the central role of the concept of the acceptable  level  of SPS
risk based on risk assessment  consistent  with available multilaterally approved criteria and
87definitions and with contracting parties'  responsibilities  to protect human, animal  and plant
health and their obligation to allow maximum trade opportunities;...."  (GATT  1990).
The  GATT  secretariat  set out  some useful  observations  on  risk assessment  in  1991
(GATT 1992).  They recognized three principal steps in SPS risk management that might give
rise to restrictions  on trade,  inadvertent  or otherwise.  First,  risk assessment  involves  an
evaluation  of the  likelihood  of a  pest  or  disease  becoming  established  or  its  potential
consequences,  or,  in the case of additives,  contaminants  and toxins, the potential  adverse
effects  on  human  or  animal  health.  Second,  risk  assessment  involves  determining  the
acceptable level of risk.  That is, meeting societal preferences through "negligible risk" levels
for  food  quality,  or through acceptable  "tolerance"  levels  for  contaminants.  Third,  risk
assessment  involves the  selection  and  application of health  and  sanitary risk  management
measures by governments.  It is the latter which have the potential to impose unnecessary
burdens on imported goods.
In the Agreement  itself, risk assessment is defined as "the evaluation  of the likelihood of
entry,  establishment  or  spread  of a  pest  or  disease  within  the  territory  of an  importing
Member  according  to  the  SPS  measures  which  might  be  applied,  and  of the  associated
potential biological  and economic consequences;  or the evaluation of the potential for adverse
effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives,  contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs"  (GATT  1994).  It now remains
for countries to develop suitable procedures and techniques and agree on their applicability.
Actual  decisions  are likely to be taken in the light of all the  circumstances  surrounding  a
particular case.
Case Studies of Success  and Failure Involving Risk Assessment
The testing of the SPS arrangements  must come down to a case-by-case  comparison of
actual decisions in the bilateral framework.  Decision-making is a continuous process in this
area  and individual  cases may take months or years to find resolution.  This section of the
paper  presents  a summary  analysis  of two bilateral  agreements  for exports  from NZ (one
successful and one not) and two agreements for imports into NZ  (also one successful  and one
not).  They illustrate  the important point  made by GATT  (1992,  p.9) that determining  an
acceptable  level of risk requires a judgement that reflects,  among other things, a society's
values and not just risk assessment itself
Apples into Australia
In 1990 the Horticultural Policy Council of Australia recommended  that it was unsafe to
import apples from NZ because of the threat of fire blight bacterial disease.  It was not clear
how the disease was transmitted (Rodriguez  1993).  The disease had been found in NZ in the
early  1920s and a prohibition on export of plant material to Australia dates from this time
(The EU accepts  apples from NZ on the basis that mature healthy fruit are not a vector of
fireblight).  Negotiations  on removing the prohibition commenced  in  1986.  Preparations
involved  a testing procedure  for the presence of bacteria,  isolation of disease free  supply
88areas,  free  access  to  laboratories,  and  product  treatment  before  export.  The  Australian
quarantine  authorities  [AQIS]  ruled that the draft proposal for NZ imports did not provide
sufficient  safeguards in 1990.  This decision was based on biological  conditions,  economic
analysis of impacts if the disease was introduced,  and other risks associated  with importation.
Subsequently,  the Horticultural Policy Council,  a consultative body,  submitted the fire
blight working group's report to the Minister in Australia.  The Council considered  that the
risk  of fire  blight  establishing  itself in  Australia  via  apples  from NZ  was  low,  but  still
concluded that there was  some risk and that the draft agreement  should not be signed.  The
Council  acknowledged  that  quarantine  must not  be used  as  a barrier to  protect domestic
industries from foreign competition but still rejected the proposed  agreement  on the following
grounds (Rodriguez  1993):  there was no fireblight-free  district in NZ; there was a risk from
the import of large volumes  of the fruit;  the disease was  one of the most  infectious  and
devastating diseases known to affect plants;  once established, the disease would be extremely
difficult and costly to eradicate;  research indicated that the disease was one of the most erratic
and unpredictable diseases of apples and pears; and there were technical inadequacies  in the
proposed NZ quarantine arrangements.
Apples into Japan
On the June  1, 1993,  Japan agreed to grant access for fresh NZ  apples.  This decision
followed twelve years of scientific  research and five years of negotiations between the two
countries.  The discussions included codling moth control to fire blight quarantine,  residues
issues, and an offer to grant access for Japanese  apples into NZ.  Japan is free of fire blight
bacteria and the codling moth (Rowe  1993).
In June 1988, NZ scientists  submitted a codling moth (Cydiapomonella)  disinfestation
programme  to the Japanese MAFF based on a considerable period of basic research.  The
Japanese asked for more test data and then informally notified the NZ authorities  that though
the technical requirements were met, they could not approve an agreement without approving
all other concerns.  One concern was fireblight.  The Japanese  also  stated that delays were
caused by their consideration of NZ data for cherries and nectarines  and of data for apples
from Australia, Canada and the US.
In August  1991,  NZ MAF  submitted to the Japanese MAFF  a fire blight  certification
scheme, based on requirements  laid down by the Japanese MAFF.  The Japanese  accepted
these proposals in February 1993  with the exception of the chemical residue issue.
The residue issue arose from the different spraying programmes  in the two countries  and
the  fact  that some NZ  chemicals were  not registered  in Japan.  Japanese  producers  had
complained of higher residue levels on imported apples.  In March 1993,  the NZ authorities
submitted to the Japanese MHW details and lists of chemicals used on NZ apples.  The list
stipulated  which  chemicals  were  banned,  relevant  pesticide  residue  standards  and  NZ
monitoring data.  In April the NZ MAF told MHW that all apples exported from NZ to Japan
would be in compliance with existing or proposed Japanese minimum residue levels [MRLs]
or Codex MRLs where Japanese MRLs have not been  set or proposed.  The apples would
89have nil detectable residues where  chemicals have no MRLs  set in either Codex or Japanese
existing or proposed regulations.  This proposal was accepted.
Finally, the MAFF request to grant access to NZ for Japanese  apples (as  a possible quid
pro quo for their producers)  reversed  the whole process.  Now NZ  has to  scrutinize the
Japanese  quarantine  arrangements  especially with regard to fruit  fly and fungus infections.
A list of requirements was provided to the MAFF and its provisions accepted.  The relevant
Japanese  laws were amended on May 28,  1993.
Canadian  Salmon into New Zealand
Imports of Canadian uncooked  salmon were banned in NZ in the early  1980s because of
the perceived risk of importation of disease into NZ fish stocks.  The Canadian authorities
have since sought to regain access to both the NZ and Australian markets on the basis that
no other countries restricted the product.  The NZ authorities then examined the problem in
the light of the probabilities of disease introduction and concluded that the risk was so small
that imports  should be resumed.
An outline of the approach is instructive:  in order for table fish to serve as a vehicle for
the introduction of fish disease,  material of a headless, gutted,  ocean-caught  salmon would
have to find its way into a NZ river or ocean fishery.  In addition:
*  the disease must be present in the waters of origin;
*  the disease must be present in the particular fish caught (or be picked up in processing);
*  the disease causing  agent must be present in the imported tissues;
*  the diseased flesh must pass inspection and grading procedures;
*  the pathogen  in the flesh  must  survive  storage  and  processing  and  be  present  in  an
infectious dose;
*  the pathogen must be able to establish infection ether by being  swallowed or by being
absorbed through the skin of the host fish;  and
*  scraps of the flesh product must find their way into a susceptible  host fish in NZ, or an
infectious dose must find its way into contact with a susceptible fish host by some other
means.
Taking  these  factors  into  consideration,  a  non-quantitative  risk  analysis  led  to  the
conclusion that of the 23  diseases present in North American salmonids,  furunculosis,  caused
by the bacterium Aeromonas salmonicida,  was the disease which would be most likely to be
carried in the type of commodity under consideration (MacDiarmid  1995).  Quantitative risk
analysis then established the prevalence,  distribution, survival and processing  susceptibility
of A.  salmonicida in  relation  to  introduction  into  NZ  waters.  For  chilled,  headless,
eviscerated  salmon the model estimated that there is a 95 percent probability that there would
be fewer than one disease introduction per ten million tonnes imported.  The risks associated
with other diseases would be cumulative so that any risk posed by one of the other diseases
must be added to that posed by furunculosis.  To put this analysis in perspective,  the entire
annual  production  of ocean-caught  Pacific  salmon in British  Columbia  is  no  more  than
100,000 tonnes.  The volume of imports annually is expected to be less than 200 tonnes.
90Modified Genetic Material  into New Zealand
In this case,  a  NZ company  applied  to the NZ MAF for  permission to import,  from
Scotland,  sheep  semen  with  an  introduced  human  gene  which  will  cause  some  female
offspring to  produce  a rare  antitrypsin  used  in treating  the  medical  condition  congenital
emphysema.  The manufacture of such a drug treatment could bring considerable income to
the  country  which produced it.  The NZ  MAF  has given  a  clearance  for the  import, but
another body, in an advisory capacity to the Minister of Environment,  recommended  against
the importation (The Dominion, 30 September  1995).
The NZ MAF approval for the importation was made in terms of the relevant legislation.
The point in question was whether the imported semen could bring with it the infective  agent
for  the  disease  scrapie  (a  disease  of sheep  absent  from NZ  but  which  might  have been
introduced  in an earlier experiment  with imported livestock).  The approval  required  very
stringent quarantine restrictions  as regards  origins of the material and operation  of facilities
within NZ, but with these precautions the Chief Veterinary  Officer [CVO] believed the risk
was manageable (The Dominion, 20 September  1995).
The  second  group  concerned  is  called  the  Genetically  Modified  Organisms  Interim
Assessment  Group  [IAG],  which is an advisory body to the NZ Minister for Environment.
IAG  canvassed  public  opinion,  including  cultural groups  like the  Maori,  and  reached  its
conclusions  on scientific,  social and cultural,  and economic  grounds (Bay of Plenty Times,
5  October  1995).  IAG  accepted  the  views of the  CVO that  adherence  to  the NZ  MAF
Standard would ensure appropriate protection of NZ livestock from scrapie.  They believed
that quarantine would be difficult to maintain at the field station level.  There was  also a risk
of  tampering with the field security arrangements.  The economic benefits were minor because
production of the antitrypsin would likely be undertaken  overseas.  Cultural opposition to the
importation  was  strong especially  from Maori groups.  In  sum,  IAG was  opposed  to the
importation,  because of the possibility of escape and adverse public opinion.
The Minister for the Environment's decision was not binding on the importing company
putting up the  proposal  as the necessary  legislation  (the Hazardous  Substances  and  New
Organisms Bill) had not yet been passed through Parliament.  The importer could therefore
act under the NZ MAF authorization and later have it withdrawn when the pending legislation
comes into force.  The MAF only consider the importation of a disease under their legislation,
whereas  IAG  is  charged  with  considering  environmental  effects  and  cultural  and  social
outcomes of genetically modified biological material.
Legislating  for Risk
There is now a need for Member countries of the WTO SPS Agreement to sit down and
assess what they mean by "acceptable risk."  Some observers believe the difficulties of getting
uniformity in risk assessment procedures  are too great  and that the procedures proposed will
favor the big battalions.  Domestic authorities will need better guidelines to set up and operate
risk assessment procedures  and training programmes will need considerable  enhancement.
At the end of the day, of course,  political decision makers will be consulted and consensus
91views  on  acceptable  risk  are  likely  to  prevail.  Among  other  countries,  NZ  is  at  the
preliminary  stage of defining  and forming  suitable procedures  for imported  products  and
materials.
It is useful to recall the three steps in risk management identified by GATT (1992).  They
are:  evaluating the likelihood of a disease  or pest entering  a country,  or determining the
potential adverse effects on health of additives and contaminants:  determining  the "acceptable
level of risk;"  and, selection and application of measures that would limit risk to acceptable
levels and which are compatible with trade requirements.  The first is a question of scientific
assessment  or evaluation;  the  second is a question of choice;  and the  third  is a  matter of
design.  In my view, the salmon  and Australian apple cases discussed  above were primarily
cases of risk evaluation.  The question of choice also arose in the Australian case and in the
NZ modified genetic material case.  The question of design is one for policy advisors and legal
experts.  Understanding how these concepts might work can be illustrated  by bringing out the
underlying economic principles  involved.
Figure 1 shows the normal trade-offbetween  risk and net benefits,  the EV line suggesting
a positive relationship between greater benefits from the import and use of a product, and the
risks to society created by that import.  It is clear that "zero"  risk means no imports (O), and
that "no unreasonable"  risk means some threshold  level as  represented  by AB.  The latter
could be tolerances  or MRL's determined by the science  agencies.  Other things being equal,
domestic policy makers should seek measures that push the benefits from imports out to point
B.  Domestic  agencies  concerned  with licensing  or evaluation  need  to be  able to  assess
economic benefits from a proposed import, to undertake  a risk assessment  of the possible
deleterious effects of the proposed import,  and to identify  environmental  or other effects of




Figure 1.  Risk trade-offs.
92There is  a subsidiary question of whether an assessment  agency  should be making the
decision on national benefit grounds  or on quarantine  grounds.  Legislation could be drafted
to  emphasize  the  quarantine  requirements  and  the prospective  importer  left  to  make  a
commercial  decision  in the light of the constraints imposed.  Alternatively, the agency could
be required to assess the net national benefit in making the importing  and risk amelioration
decision,  in which case the agency determines the national good on behalf of the proposer.
In this case, the agency would want very clear guidelines as to the relevant costs  and benefits
to  be  considered.  As  the  domestic  requirements  are  more  and  more  determined  by
environmental considerations,  the balancing  of objectives  is more likely to be the work of an
agency and not something .which could be left to commercial  decision.  For example, how
would  one  interpret  the requirement  ".. an authority  ... may  approve  an application  [for
import] if ......  the beneficial effects of a substance outweigh the harmful effects ....?" (draft
Hazardous Substances  and New Organisms  Bill).
Figure 2 shows the case where an agency might impose conditions on the import  and use
of a product or compound.  In an SPS case, these  conditions would be related  to control
measures that reduced the risks to society if the product  is imported.  Thus risks could be
reduced to a level which was acceptable to the importing authority.  The lower axis measures
the increasing  cost of control  and the  upper axis  measures  net benefits  from the  import.
Curve MB shows marginal benefits decreasing  as amount of control increases and  curve MC
shows marginal costs of a unit of control rising at the margin.1  The optimum point of control
is  where the marginal  equality  is  reached  at  D.  The  distance  OD  represents  the  cost  of
reducing  a given amount of risk.  If the agency was concerned  with evaluating practicable
alternative methods of managing the risks involved,  it would need to develop  cost profiles  of
these methods.  If the agency was also committed to evaluating the consequences for trade
of each alternative measure (GATT  1992; Article  5, clause 4 of the Agreement  1994), then





Figure 2.  Managing risk.
'Normal  practice is for the cost of compliance to be transferred to the foreign  supplier.  A
movement  toward  the  optimum  could  be  achieved  by  the  two  countries  agreeing  on  a
mutually beneficial  arrangement.
93It would appear that legislation in this area needs to include:
* clear definitions of the benefits to be gained by an import;
* clear guidelines for identifying the degree of risk on introduction;
* clear provisions for the identification of the relevant cost and benefits;
* clear guidelines for identifying management strategies for risk control;  and
* clear provisions for understanding the international implications of each import and  control
strategy.
Conclusions
The  case  studies  analyzed  demonstrate  that  different  countries  have  different
understandings of acceptable risk, and that risks associated with the introduction of a product
can be identified  and measured.  They show that countries  can  develop  risk containment
(quarantine)  programs  that  satisfy  the  requirements  of other  countries.  Meeting  these
requirements  involves  extra  costs for exporters  including  field hygiene  programs,  testing
products,  and inspection  and certification services.
The discussion  shows that the evaluation,  choice  and  design of legislation  for import
protocols is important.  Legislation will need to provide for evaluation of risk, identification
of costs  and  benefits,  identification  of risk  management  strategies,  and  implications  of
different strategies for trade.  Such legislation should recognize the principle of transparency
and be based on scientific principles.
The  SPS  Agreement  has  started  the process  of harmonization  and transparency  for
standards  for food and related  products that have the potential to harm human,  plant and
animal health.  Gigantic steps have been taken to introduce uniformity between countries for
such technical requirements.  Part of such a uniform approach must be a greater degree of
harmonization of risk assessment procedures  and agreement  on acceptable risk.  It may be
that countries may never be able to agree absolutely  on acceptable risk but the presence  of
the Agreement  can  help countries move toward  more common  ground with the decisions
made more transparent.
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Prohibitions: meat from boars or cryptorchid pigs; from animals  to which prohibited
substances have been administered;  containing residues of hormonal substances; residues of
antibiotics, pesticides or other substances; meat treated with ultraviolet radiation;  meat from
animals with tuberculosis or trichinae; animals slaughtered too young; parts with traumatic
lesions; (blood/whole); minced meat; pieces less than 100 grams; and heads of cattle.
Restrictions:  only meat prepared or stored in approved establishments;  only meat prepared
in accordance with 3CVD; products must meet specifications of individual importing country
include head meats, pieces less than 100g,  game, game meat, minced meat, or mechanically
deboned meat.
Personnel: persons who are a possible source of contamination  shall be prohibited from
working and subject to provision of a medical certificate.
Listing: all premises shall be listed with the appropriate  authorities.
Categories of fresh meat permitted entry: beef, sheep, goats, horses and bobby calves; part
carcasses according to country; from approved cutting premises; head meats, etc.  as per
country requirements; raw materials for pharmaceutical processing;  and unprocessed pig
bristles.
Processing requirements: appropriate temperatures  for cutting  and further processing;
warm boning and hot boning where appropriate; secure detaining facilities;  premises listed
for each member state; meet provisions of EC Meat Products Directive,  e.g.,  requirements
with regard to process control, supervision, contamination of materials, construction of
rooms, vermin control, working areas, instruments and equipment, cleanliness of staff,
separate storage of raw materials,  and animal parts not permitted  as specified.
Inspection:  ante mortem and post mortem inspection for all animals slaughtered;  specific
requirements as to bovines;  veterinary inspection of packhouses and cold stores.
Branding: use of approved ink; number of brands per carcass or part thereof; offal as
specified;  containers as specified; consumer packs as specified; requirements as to
packaging, carcasses and cartons;  seals and cleanliness.
Labeling: product must be clearly dated or coded with date of slaughter;  labelling of
foodstuffs as specified; appropriate terminology;  aurability and use-by dates.
Storage and transport:  meet minimum storage temperatures;  isolate different products;
meet minimum transport temperatures.
Specific products: requirements with regard to pieces  less than 100g; edible bovine lungs
and tracheas;  edible blood and blood products;  sliced bovine livers; game meat, game,
inedible byproducts including high risk material, pig bristles, casings, and materials for
pharmaceutical processing.
Certification: appropriate certificate  for country of destination for fresh meat and for meat
products as specified.
Source:  Overseas Requirements  and Certification,  MAF Regulatory Authority, Wellington.
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